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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Two recent Chechen-Russian wars have taken a disastrous toll on the 
civilian population and produced numerous allegations of grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions and of other horrendous violations of 
international humanitarian law. Charges of extrajudicial executions, 
forced disappearances, murder, rape and torture have been leveled against 
both the Moscow government/federal troops, as well as against Chechen 
rebels.1  
In 2000, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, Putin’s media policy advisor, 
announced that Russian authorities had information on 427 cases of 
alleged crimes committed by federal forces in Chechnya. Yet, only 29 
investigations were opened into these allegations of human rights abuse.2 
Last year, President Putin declared that the military prosecutor's office 
had investigated 127 crimes committed against Chechen civilians by 
Russian troops. However, Oleg Orlov, the chairman of the Memorial 
human rights group that has been monitoring the situation in Chechnya for 
several years, has charged that many of these cases were dropped before 
being brought to court. “There have been thousands of complaints from 
victims, but by the end of January only 162 cases had come to court. Out of 
97 cases investigated in 2002, 40 were dropped for lack of evidence. 
Overall, only 46 Russian servicemen have been convicted.”3 Nevertheless, 
the growing number of charges has propelled international humanitarian 
concern.  
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On February 24, 2001, a dumping ground filled with human remains 
was discovered in a village called Dachny, which is located less than a 
kilometer away from Russia’s main military base in Chechnya. Fifty-one 
bodies were found in this mass grave. Nineteen of those bodies were 
identified, and of those at least sixteen were the remains of individuals 
who were last seen alive in the custody of Russian federal forces. Most 
were dressed in civilian clothing. Some were blindfolded, and many had 
their hands and/or feet bound. This mass “dumping site” – the bodies 
were dumped along streets in the village and in abandoned cottages over 
an extended period of time – provides concrete evidence of the Russian 
federal forces’ practice of forced disappearances, torture, and 
extrajudicial execution in Chechnya. The mass “dumping ground” has been 
under Russian military control since December 1999, long before the vast 
majority of the bodies were deposited there. However, the Russian 
government’s investigation into this case has been woefully inadequate. 
Russian authorities, in the course of their investigation, failed to preserve 
potentially crucial evidence that could have led to the identification of 
those responsible for the mass killings.  
Dachny is not the only such site of unmarked graves to be found in 
Chechnya. In March 2001, Human Rights Watch issued a report titled, 
“The ‘Dirty War’ in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture and 
Summary Executions,” that documented eight mass graves and eight other 
makeshift burial sites where corpses of the “disappeared” and others had 
been found.4 Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Medical 
Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture and the Memorial Human 
Rights Center have all urged Moscow on numerous occasions to properly 
investigate, and establish a meaningful accountability process for, the 
thousands of cases of forced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial 
executions that have occurred in Chechnya. In spite of these calls, legal 
bodies in Russia have time and again rejected the pleas of these bodies. The 
2004 Council of Europe report released last January revealed that over 
the past three years nearly 10,000 human rights abuse claims had been 
brought before the Office of Russia’s special representative in Chechnya. 
Yet, investigations into most of those complaints were rarely ever 
completed.5 Given the Russian government’s intransigence on this issue, it 
is understandable that Chechen victims of Russian human rights abuse 
would want to try to seek redress outside of Russia. Some victims, and 
families of victims, of human rights abuse in Chechnya have begun to take 
their cases to the European Human Rights Court. Indeed, “the Strasbourg-
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based European court has already accepted several cases. A total of 150 
lawsuits have been filed by Chechens.”6  
While both Russian and Chechen sides have often been accused of 
resorting to harsh methods during the conflict, Western criticism of 
Russian policy in Chechnya has been greatly subdued since the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US homeland. Immediately after the 
attacks, many world leaders began to accept Moscow’s assertion that 
there was a link between Chechen rebels and international terrorism. The 
US administration seems to have bought the argument made by the Russian 
President that his government’s war in Chechnya is a contribution to the 
US-led global counter-terrorist campaign. The general response of the 
international community to the accusations of Russian human rights abuse 
in Chechnya has been restrained by the oft repeated argument that the 
struggle between Chechnya and Russia is an internal conflict that the 
Russian government reserves the right to resolve without outside 
interference.  
The Chechen situation has been shielded from the scrutiny of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). While the UNCHR has 
condemned the human rights abuses in Chechnya, it stopped short of 
creating an international commission of inquiry, requiring only that 
Russia establish a national commission of inquiry. This body is obviously 
sensitive to Russia’s insistence that the “Chechen problem” is a domestic 
and not international one. In 2002, Russia refused to extend the mandate 
of the Organization of Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
assistance group that was responsible for reporting on human rights 
conditions, facilitating humanitarian relief, and promoting a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis.7 No improvement was observed in 2003. Aside 
from well-intended and strongly worded declarations of concern, the 
international community has failed to devise any political or financial 
enforcement measures to remedy the humanitarian situation in Chechnya. 
An initiative of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) could have provided a potential breakthrough.8 In the spring of 
2003, PACE passed a resolution that proposed the creation of a special ad 
hoc war crimes tribunal to safeguard the rights and freedoms of Chechens 
and to ensure that all crimes against humanity are investigated, regardless 
of the perpetrators’ ethnicity. Unfortunately, realpolitik worked against 
the PACE initiative, and Russia’s dramatic rollback of human rights and 
the rule of law once again topped the agenda of the EU-Russia summit in 
November 2004. 
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This article aims to accomplish two purposes. First, it analyzes the 
nature and scope of violations of humanitarian law, focusing especially 
on sexual violence in Chechnya, to determine the extent to which a climate 
of impunity exists that would warrant international intervention in order 
to hold those responsible for these abuses accountable. Second, the article 
evaluates prospects for the progressive efforts by the international 
community, particularly through the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
to break the cycle of violence, rape and abuse in Chechnya, to halt 
atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population, and to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators. By discussing the work done to develop 
international criminality around rape and showing how this issue was 
inserted in the Rome Statute, this part of the article will demonstrate the 
reasons why the International Criminal Court may be needed to deal with 
crimes against humanity committed in Chechnya.  
 
T H E  S C O P E  O F  S E X U A L  V I O L E N C E  I N  C H E C H N Y A   
The soldiers took the girl into an empty house and sometime later they 
returned her, saying “Hide this bitch somewhere. More soldiers are 
coming after us, they will kill and rape her anyway.” She was seventeen or 
eighteen. This is not the only case; a married woman was also raped. But 
people keep it a secret, they say she was not raped because it causes such 
great shame. People just don’t speak about it.9 
Disclosing and documenting the widespread use of sexual violence and 
rape against the civilian population during the war in Chechnya is an 
extremely difficult task for two reasons: 1) because of the attempts by the 
Russian government to suppress this information, and; 2) because of the 
cultural taboo and religious stigma attached to such issues within the 
Muslim tradition. The mother of a young girl who was raped and then 
killed during an interrogation session by Russian soldiers is known to 
have said that in Chechen society “rape is worse than murder.”10 The 
surviving female victims of sexual violence are generally ostracized from 
Muslim communities and, in the case of unmarried survivors, are extremely 
unlikely to wed if the incidence of rape becomes public knowledge.  
Until recently, aside from sporadic disturbing testimonies of rape 
victims, it was difficult to find a substantial body of reliable evidence of 
sexual abuse in Chechnya.11 This situation has changed recently. In the 
spring of 2004, the British Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
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Torture published “Rape and Other Torture in the Chechnya Conflict”– 
the first systematic and substantiated study to produce medical and 
psychological documentation of thirty-five asylum seekers (nineteen 
women and sixteen men) from the Chechnya conflict at the Medical 
Foundation’s treatment centre in London. Sixteen women and one man 
disclosed that they had been raped.  In thirteen of the cases the rape was 
allegedly carried out by Russian soldiers, in three cases, the alleged 
perpetrators were said to be Russian police officers, and in the final case, 
the victim claimed that the perpetrators were Chechen rebels.12 The 
medico-legal reports prepared by professionals who had years of 
experience dealing with victims of sexual violence provided evidence that 
rape as a method of torture is broadly and consistently being used as a 
tool of war in the Chechen-Russian conflict. This study confirmed that 
more than half of the rape victim survivors felt shame and feared dishonor 
or stigmatization. One female victim who conceived a child as a result of 
the rape was insulted, tormented, and even physically assaulted by 
another woman in her community once her pregnancy and rape became 
public knowledge. One victim exclaimed: “so great is the stigma attached to 
rape, many Chechen women commit suicide rather than live with the 
burden of their shame.” Another woman witnessed the suicide of her 
cellmate who had been raped, which essentially confirms the above 
point.13 Rapes in Chechnya occur in the villages, at checkpoints, and in 
detention centers. Fear of rape is so pervasive that many families flee in a 
desperate attempt to protect their female members.  
Despite the cultural and religious taboos against speaking out on this 
issue, testimonies of sexual assaults in Chechnya have continued to 
surface. At the same time, Russian law enforcement agencies have more 
often than not failed to launch serious investigations or to prosecute the 
perpetrators of such crimes. This only serves to perpetuate the existence of 
a climate of impunity.   
One of the most serious tests for Russia’s military justice system was 
the high profile trial of Colonel Budanov. Yuri Budanov (38), a rising star 
in the Russian army and a hardened veteran of both Chechen wars, was 
decorated with two medals for valor, including the Order of Virtue. This 
high-ranking officer had moved quickly up the ranks of the Russian army 
and was about to be promoted to General when his brilliant career was 
suddenly and dramatically stalled. The reason? Budanov became the first 
Russian officer to be publicly tried for crimes committed against civilians 
in Chechnya. On the night of March 27, 2000, after celebrating his 
daughter’s birthday, Budanov decided to act on an intelligence report that 
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a sniper collaborating with Chechen rebels lived in the village of Tangi-
Chu. Around midnight, Budanov in a drunken rampage, together with three 
other soldiers, kidnapped eighteen-year-old Kheda (Elza) Kungaeva from 
her father’s home and brought her to a secluded military encampment. 
During the interrogation, Budanov allegedly beat, raped, and strangled 
Kheda Kungaeva, and then ordered his men to bury her.   
A few days later, Budanov was arrested and charged with homicide, 
kidnapping and abuse of power. He admitted to strangling the girl but 
claimed to be in a “state of temporary insanity.” However, he vociferously 
denied raping the girl or acting in a premeditated manner. An autopsy 
report obtained by the Kungaeva family revealed, however, that the victim 
had indeed been raped. This new evidence undermined the argument by 
Budanov’s defense that he had acted in a fit of rage. Nevertheless, the final 
report somehow failed to make mention of the rape and ultimately the 
charge of sexual assault against Budanov was dropped. On March 29, 
2000, the Chief of the Russian Army General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, 
said of the incident: “it is a savage and shameful event for the armed 
forces. Budanov has shown himself to be a bandit in relation to the 
civilian population. Scumbags like that should be rooted out of the army 
collective.”14 Following his arrest, Budanov underwent psychiatric 
examination in two different hospitals and was declared to have been 
responsible for his actions. A year later, on April 21, 2001, the case 
finally went to court. Budanov was once again sent to the Serbsky State 
Scientific Center for Social and Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow for a 
psychiatric examination. This time the examination concluded that he was 
not mentally responsible for his actions. In late 2002, a district court 
ordered him to undertake a compulsory in-patient psychiatric treatment. 
But two months later, on February 28, 2003, the Russian Supreme Court’s 
Military Collegium reversed the earlier decision of the district court and 
ordered a retrial. On July 25, 2003, Budanov was found guilty, sentenced 
to ten years in prison, and stripped of his military rank and order. On 
May 17, 2004, he filed an appeal for a pardon. In the fall of that year a 
commission in Ulyanovsk recommended that Budanov be pardoned. This 
initiative was supported by the regional governor, Vladimir Shamanov, 
Budanov’s former commanding officer in Chechnya. Under pressure from 
human rights groups and the government of Chechnya, and in light of 
growing protests in Chechnya, Budanov retracted his request for pardon. 
The Budanov case has become a political issue with serious 
repercussions for Russian policy and rhetoric with respect to the anti-
terrorist cause. For over two years, Russia’s military justice system has 
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been paralyzed, unable to decide on Budanov’s sanity even after ordering 
six medical examinations. Russian authorities have turned “to a familiar 
partner from Soviet times, a psychiatric profession that for decades 
followed orders to camouflage political problems behind the opaque 
curtain of mental illness. In doing so, however, officials have resurrected 
questions about psychiatry's shameful past in the Soviet Union – and its 
highly politicized present.”15 Moscow authorities used this case to attain 
their political goals. They demonized Budanov before the elections in 
Chechnya and gained important votes. However, after the election was 
held, they were silent about their earlier declared readiness to punish him. 
Meanwhile, Budanov is now celebrated as a national hero in Russia. 
Polls conducted by Komsomolskaya Pravda, a Moscow-based daily, 
showed that some 79% of Russia’s population supports him.16 Budanov’s 
trial has demonstrated the Russian national authorities’ lack of political 
will and the ambivalent attitudes of ordinary Russians about bringing to 
justice those responsible for abuse during the wars in Chechnya. Domestic 
politics has become a clear obstacle to enforcing human rights in 
Chechnya, creating a need for outside intervention to ensure that these 
incidences of human rights abuse in Chechnya do not go unpunished. 
 
I S  T H E R E  A  R O L E  F O R  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
C R I M I N A L  C O U R T ?  
On September 13, 2000, the Russian Federation signed the multilateral 
treaty, the Rome Statute, which took force on July 1, 2002. Russia has yet 
to ratify this statute.17 Perhaps one reason for not doing so is their 
anticipation that Russian military and political leaders could eventually 
wind up before this international criminal court facing charges of crimes 
against humanity during the Chechnya campaign. After all, the US 
government, also concerned about the possibility that its military and 
political leaders could be indicted for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, not only refused to ratify the Rome Statute but also withdrew 
its signature from the document. On May 7, 2002, when US President 
George W. Bush announced the US’s withdrawal, US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying, “The United States will regard as 
illegitimate any attempt by the court or state parties to the treaty to assert 
the ICC’s jurisdiction over American citizens.”18 Therefore, one can 
understand the reluctance of Russian government officials to fully endorse 
the Rome Statute. 
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Whether or not there is a role for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in addressing the issue of rape and other war crimes being committed 
in Chechnya is really a matter of academic debate until Russia decides to 
ratify this multilateral treaty. But it bears mentioning that the ICC was 
created precisely to deal with war crimes (like rape) and other crimes 
against humanity that are not being addressed adequately by national 
courts. It is fair to say, from the evidence provided above, that the Russian 
national courts have not properly responded to accusations of Russian 
military abuses in Chechnya. 
It is also important to bear in mind that it took almost seventy years of 
debate and deliberation over the need for a permanent criminal court at 
the international level before action was finally taken to bring one into 
being. Of particular interest here is the foundational legal work done to 
ensure that war crimes such as rape be included in the new international 
humanitarian law that would govern the operations of the ICC. 
In the past, rape and acts of sexual violence committed against women 
during conflict situations generally went unrecognized and unchallenged. 
In many of these conflicts, both military and political leaders tended to 
view rape more often than not as a fringe benefit or perk of war. More 
recently, however, particularly after the revelations of organized, 
systematic patterns of mass rape in the Yugoslavian conflict, there has 
been an effort to treat rape as a war crime. While there is no evidence that 
Russians soldiers are using rape in a systematic way or as a deliberate 
strategy of ethnic cleansing, as has been charged in other cases, there is 
still a sense that rape and other war crimes have been used in the 
Chechnya campaign to demoralize the “enemy.”   
Today, instances of rape during conflicts are less tolerated than 
previously. However, the crime of rape has long existed under customary 
international law. One can go back to 1474 when Peter von Hagenbach 
was convicted of a number of offenses, including rape, and ordered to be 
executed.19 The Leiber Code, signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 
1853, listed rape as a specific offense and made it a capital offense 
punishable by death (see article 44). The Code was adopted as 
international law in 1907 at an international peace conference in 
Copenhagen. The Hague Conventions, the World War II prosecutions, and 
the Geneva Conventions all reinforced prohibitions against rape and 
other sexual violence during times of war. Although it was not codified in 
their Charter, some evidence of sexual violence was presented after World 
War II to the International Military Tribunals, most notably, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East where rape was first 
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specifically referenced in the judgments. In the Tokyo Trials, although rape 
and other acts of sexual violence fell within the general category of 
“Crimes Against Humanity” and were not treated as separate substantive 
war crimes, the prosecuting lawyers did make an attempt to put forward 
evidence of the sexual atrocities committed against women in Nanking, 
Borneo, the Philippines, and French Indo-China. The Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10, under the heading of “Punishment of Persons Guilty 
of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against Humanity,” specifically 
listed rape as a war crime in its charter.  
This legal foundation has allowed those responsible for the 
development of our new body of international humanitarian law to make 
rape and other violent sexual acts part of the list of prohibited war-time 
activity and has put the international community in a better position to 
investigate, document, and prosecute rape and other forms of sexual 
violence. Rape and sexual violence are now clearly enumerated offenses 
under international humanitarian law, particularly after 1993 and 1994 
when such violations were specifically codified for the first time as 
recognizable and independent crimes within the statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
for Rwanda (ICTR). These two documents are part of the legal foundation 
upon which the ICC was built. The two ad hoc tribunals have, in effect, 
provided solid case law for prohibiting rape and sexual violence during 
wartime.  
Those ICTY and ICTR cases have reinforced the legal basis for arguing 
that rape and sexual violence are separate “crimes against humanity” and 
that they constitute specific violations of the laws and customs of war. 
This jurisprudence coming from the tribunals has set the precedent for the 
criminal prosecution of anyone involved in such war crimes. It essentially 
began with the prosecution of Jean-Paul Akayesu, who was accused of 
using rape and acts of sexual violence for the purpose of intimidation, 
degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control and the 
destruction of a person. What came out of the Akayesu case was that rape, 
like torture, must be considered a violation of personal dignity and as 
constituting torture particularly when it is done with the consent of a 
public official or someone acting in an official capacity. What we also 
learn from the Akayesu decision is that rape or sexual violence can be 
prosecuted as genocide if there is evidence to show that it was done to 
physically or psychologically destroy individuals or members of a group.   
The ICTY has also provided similar legal precedents in the cases of 
Celebici, Furudzija, and Delalic. In the judgments handed down against 
98  spacesofidentity 5.1 (2005)   
 
98 
these individuals, rape was recognized as a violation of the Laws and 
Customs of War and as a basis of torture under the Geneva Conventions. 
In the cases of Celebici, Furudzija and Delalic, the ICTY pointed to the 
despicable nature of the act of rape during wartime and to the fact that 
this act struck at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity.  
The development of humanitarian law to address instances of rape and 
sexual violence has continued under the ICC Statute. Even the United 
States was a strong advocate for the inclusion of rape and sexual violence 
as specific offences for the world body to punish, during the preparatory 
meetings leading up to the signing of the Rome Statute.  
The ICC was intended to complement national criminal justice systems, 
not to replace them. With the kind of evidence that has been produced 
recently of rape and sexual violence in the Chechnya campaign, the onus is 
up to the Russian government to prosecute vigorously the perpetrators of 
these war crimes and crimes against humanity. If the national courts of the 
Russian government fail to prosecute these crimes, then the argument for 
the utilization of the International Criminal Court is strengthened. 
However, the court cannot address those cases until Russia ratifies the 
Rome Statute and acknowledges that the victims of those crimes cannot get 
a fair hearing in the country’s national courts.  
As Holly Cartner, executive director of the Europe and Central Asia 
division of Human Rights Watch has put it: “It would certainly be a step 
in the right direction if the Russian government actually prosecuted a 
serviceman for rape… But a single prosecution wouldn’t begin to address 
the problem. There have been hundreds of war crimes, including summary 
executions and rapes, committed by Russian soldiers in Chechnya.”20   
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